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A PROPOSED STANDARD FOR AMENDED
SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
AS APPLIED TO REDISTRICTING
Zachary j Sullivan*
INTRODUCTION
Many minorities still did not have the right to vote' nearly a hun-
dred years after the Reconstruction AmendmentS2 guaranteed them
this constitutional right and others.3 The Voting Rights Act of 19654
(VRA) was to the pre-1965 electoral system what the Reconstruction
Amendments were to the institution of slavery. And just as the Recon-
struction Amendments required the VRA (an amendment of sorts) to
give them any real meaning, the VRA has required amendments of its
own.5 Most recently, Congress reauthorized section 5 for the next
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.A., Government,
Georgetown University, 2006. Many thanks to Professor Lloyd Mayer for sparking my
interest in election law and his advice on this topic; my parents, Jerry and Lisa
Sullivan, for their love and support; and my fianc6e, Justine Gregory, for her love,
patience, and encouragement.
1 This Note is concerned with vote dilution, a form of disenfranchisement.
While vote denial involves the right to vote, vote dilution involves the effectiveness of
the vote. Minorities may not realize they are disenfranchised when their disen-
franchisement takes the form of vote dilution. The Supreme Court mostly recently
dealt with vote dilution under the VRA in Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
2 U.S. Const. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
3 To be sure, pre-1965 disenfranchisement was not limited to the South. In
terms of vote dilution through redistricting, arguably the "finest example of the
'stacked' districts [could] be found in the imaginatively defiant handiwork of the New
York State legislature in carving congressional boundaries for use during the sixties."
Gus Tyler, Court Versus Legislature (The Socio-Politics of Malapportionment), LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS., Summer 1962, at 390, 401.
4 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973-1973c (2006)).
5 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a-1973c (2006)); Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973aa (2006)).
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twenty-five years and amended it through the Fannie Lou Hamer,
Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 20066 (VRARA). This Note is concerned
with a subsection added to section 5 through the VRARA; this subsec-
tion makes it a violation of section 5 for a proposed redistricting plan7
to "diminish [ ] the ability" of minorities "to elect their preferred can-
didates of choice" when compared to the plan currently in effect, i.e.,
benchmark districting.8
To name only a few ways, vote dilution through redistricting can
occur through the apportionment of a higher number of people
(regardless of race or color) in some districts than in others9 or
through the apportionment of minorities in single and multimember
districts.10 The single or multimember districts may be equal in popu-
6 Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973b (2006)).
7 Of course, section 5 applies to more than just redistricting, but redistricting is
especially relevant given the upcoming congressional redistricting.
As way of background, the terms "redistricting" and "apportioning" are often
used interchangeably. This Note uses "redistricting" to denote the process of drawing
geographical boundaries for elections and "apportioning" to denote the allocating of
a number of people in a district. For a helpful explanation of the difference between
these two terms, see the following definitions provided by the U.S. Census Bureau:
Apportionment is defined as "the process of determining the number of seats to
which each state is entitled in the U.S. House of Representatives based on the decen-
nial census." Redistricting is defined as "the process of revising the geographic
boundaries within a state from which people elect their representatives to the U.S.
House of Representatives, state legislature, county or city council, school board, etc."
POPULATION DIV., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHAT You SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE APPOR-
TIONMENT CouNTs 4 (2000), http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/pioOO-ac.pdf.
8 The added subsection reads:
Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting that has the purpose of or will have the
effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United States on
account of race or color . . . to elect their preferred candidates of choice
denies or abridges the right to vote within the meaning of subsection (a) of
this section.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (2006).
9 For landmark cases recognizing and providing standards for identifying uncon-
stitutional vote dilution through the apportionment of a higher number of people
(regardless of race or color) in some districts than in others, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
10 For landmark cases recognizing and providing standards for vote dilution
through the apportionment of minorities in single and multimember districts in viola-
tion of the Fifteenth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,
or section 2 of the VRA, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)), see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986);
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lation, yet the apportionment of minorities among them can amount
to vote dilution. "Cracking" denotes dividing up a concentrated
minority population among multiple districts to avoid giving minori-
ties the ability to elect their candidates of choice. 1 "Packing" denotes
apportioning a large number of minorities into a single district to
avoid giving them the ability to elect their candidates of choice in
other districts. 1 2 "Stacking" denotes combining a large number of
minorities with an even larger number of whites into a single district,
so that the minorities do not have the ability to elect their candidates
of choice.1 3
Section 5 applies only to "covered jurisdictions," which are
expressly listed in the statute.14 Section 5 requires covered jurisdic-
tions to receive preclearance from the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) or a declaratory judgment from the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia15 before making a change to "any voting qualifi-
cation or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting"' 6 (covered change). Preclearance is granted if
the covered jurisdiction proves that the covered change does not have
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973);
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960).
11 JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE 117-18 (1995).
12 Id.
13 Id. Cracking, packing, and stacking were especially effective at vote dilution
before the "one person, one vote" standard announced in Reynolds required equal
populations in each district. 377 U.S. 558-59 (citing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
381 (1963)). Before the "one person, one vote" standard,
[t]he "cracked" district [was] the huge metropolitan center, torn apart into
separate pieces, each ... attached to and outvoted by a surrounding rural
hinterland. The "packed" district [was] the one with a concentrated urban
population containing two or three or even four times as many inhabitants as a
neighboring district. The "stacked" district [was] the child of the gerryman-
der, a delicately carved creature, resembling nothing more than the partisan
and rapacious soul of his political creator.
Tyler, supra note 3, at 400-01 (emphasis added).
14 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2006). The majority of jurisdictions are in the South
because of their history of discriminatory practices. See David L. Epstein & Sharyn
O'Halloran, Does the New VRA Section 5 Overrule Georgia v. Ashcroft ?, 63 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURv. AM. L. 631, 636-37 & n.29 (2008).
15 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). Preclearance indicates to covered jurisdictions
that they may enact or administer the covered change.
16 Id. A proposed redistricting plan is a "covered change." See generally Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (explaining different types of covered
changes).
20101 1265
1266 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:3
the purpose or effect 17 of "denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color"18 as compared to the status quo.19 In other
words, preclearance is granted if the covered change does not dilute
the vote as compared to the status quo. 2 0 The VRARA prohibits a
covered change from "diminishing the ability" of minorities "to elect
their preferred candidates of choice." Diluting the vote as compared
to the status quo has long been a prohibited effect, but the added
subsection makes clear that a nondiluted vote includes the ability to
elect a candidate of choice. Congress added the subsection to over-
rule the Supreme Court's holding in Georgia v. Ashcroft,' which
moved the focus of a prohibited effect away from the ability to elect,
and permitted the trading of descriptive representation of minorities
for substantive representation. 2 2  This contradicted the DOJ's
decades-old standard for a prohibited effect 23 based on the interpreta-
tion set forth in Beer v. United States.24
Part I of this Note examines the standard for a prohibited effect
before the VRARA. Part II addresses the ability-to-elect standard for
determining whether a proposed redistricting plan "diminish[es] the
ability" of minorities "to elect their preferred candidates of choice."
17 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). Although the change garnered little attention (for good
reason), the VRARA amended subsection (a) by striking "does not have the purpose
and will not have the effect" and inserting "neither has the purpose nor will have the
effect." Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 581 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b (2006)). This amendment is of little consequence. The Senate Report does
not explain it and the House Report only notes in a footnote that the purpose of the
amendment is to "make[ ] clear that both prongs must be satisfied before a voting
change may be precleared." H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 65 n.168 (2006). In other
words, the amendment makes clear that a covered jurisdiction must prove that a cov-
ered change has neither a prohibited effect nor prohibited purpose. The amendment
of consequence for this Note was made to subsection (b).
18 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a).
19 By its express language, section 5 does not call for a covered change's compari-
son with the status quo, but long ago the Court read section 5 as calling for a compari-
son, i.e., prohibiting retrogression. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976);
see infra Part I.
20 This means that a covered change could pass the tests for vote dilution under
the Constitution and section 2 of the VRA, but fail under section 5 because minorities
fare better under the status quo than under the covered change. Furthermore, the
covered change may violate the Constitution and section 2, but the DOJ must grant
preclearance as long as the minorities fare better under the covered change than
under the status quo. Of course, someone could then challenge the new status quo as
a violation of the Constitution or section 2.
21 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
22 Id. at 480-81.
23 See infra Part I.
24 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
A PROPOSED STANDARD FOR AMENDED SECTION 5
This Part analyzes the standard provided in the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee's Report25 and briefly discusses the House Judiciary Commit-
tee's Report,2 6 which does not include a standard. In addition, this
Part analyzes both the standard used by the DOJ prior to Ashcroft and
the relatively extreme standard proposed by Nathaniel Persily.27
This Note proposes a standard that would require a proposed
redistricting plan to at least maintain the number of districts in which
it is more likely than not2 8 that minorities will elect their preferred
candidates of choice (ability-to-elect districts).29 There are three note-
worthy qualities of this proposed standard: First, if this is the only
requirement, then it implies that the proposed standard focuses on
the redistricting plan as a whole, not a district standing alone. Sec-
ond, the proposed standard protects "coalitional districts"-districts
in which minorities constitute the minority, but where it is still more
likely than not minorities will elect their preferred candidates of
choice-with white crossover to or coalition of other minorities with
minorities in voting.30 Third, the proposed standard permits the trad-
ing of "safe districts"-ability-to-elect districts in which it is "highly
likely" that minorities will elect their preferred candidates of choice,
without the assistance of whites and other minority groups-for coali-
tional districts because they are both ability-to-elect districtsA'
The proposed standard differs from the DOJ's in its definition of
an ability-to-elect district. This Note conceives of an ability-to-elect dis-
trict as one in which it is more likely than not that minorities will elect
their preferred candidates of choice. In contrast, the DOJ standard
requires a higher degree of likelihood in order for a district to be an
"opportunity district," or ability-to-elect district. Also, the proposed
standard permits the trading of safe districts for coalitional districts,
unlike the DOJ's standard. The proposed standard differs from the
25 S. REP. No. 109-295 (2006).
26 H.R. REP. No. 109-478 (2006).
27 See Nathaniel Persily, The Promises and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117
YALE L.J. 174, 216-50 (2007).
28 In this Note, "more likely than not" denotes more than fifty-percent
probability. This Note also uses "highly likely," which denotes a greater probability
than "more likely than not."
29 See infra Part II.E. This Note does not address how to determine the minori-
ties' "preferred candidates of choice." This Note focuses on how to determine
whether the minorities' ability to elect has been diminished, presuming the preferred
candidates of choice have been determined. For a discussion of "preferred candi-
dates of choice," see Persily, supra note 27, at 219-34.
30 "Assistance from whites and other minority groups" denotes white crossover to
or coalition of other minorities with minorities in voting.
31 See infra Part II.D.
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Senate Report's in its protection of coalitional districts. Unlike the
proposed standard, the Senate Report's standard focuses on a district
standing alone.
The proposed standard draws from a discussion in Ashcroft, in
which the Court described two proposed redistricting plans that
would not reduce minorities' ability to elect their candidates of
choice. Most notably, the four dissenting Justices endorsed the major-
ity's dictum on the ability to elect. To the extent that the interpreta-
tion of section 5 in Ashcroft was based on constitutional avoidance,3 2
the proposed standard may avoid constitutional difficulty from the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or enforce-
ment clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.33 While
the Supreme Court recently avoided answering the question of
whether preclearance is constitutional (regardless of the standard
employed) in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v.
Holder 3 4 Ashcroft indicates that the Court is not hesitant to take a close
look at the standard for section 5.
I. FROM BEER TO AsHcRoF- THE PRE-VRARA STANDARD FOR
PROHIBITED EFFECT
Section 5 originally had the relatively modest aim of ensuring
that covered jurisdictions did not find a new way to deny the vote to
minorities after section 4 temporarily suspended literacy tests, the pri-
mary way states had been denying the vote.35 Section 5 was not aimed
at vote dilution, but at vote denial.36 Not only did section 5 have a
modest aim, but it also went relatively unused by the DOJ. "Far from
moving forcefully to insure that states and localities demonstrate that
they were not trying to undercut federal supervision of voter registra-
tion and the suspension of literacy tests by enacting new laws, the
Johnson Administration largely left voter registration, as well as law-
32 It is unclear whether the Court was motivated by constitutional avoidance in its
statutory interpretation of section 5. See Persily, supra note 27, at 176-77.
33 However, the proposed standard may be problematic if constitutional avoid-
ance is responsible for both the Court's ability-to-elect discussion and the holding that
section 5 permitted a proposed redistricting plan's reducing the ability of minorities
to elect their candidates of choice as compared to the benchmark districting, pro-
vided that there was an increase in minorities' opportunityto participate in the politi-
cal process. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
34 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
35 Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 14, at 636.
36 See id. at 635-36.
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suits, to civil rights organizations."3 7 However, once the Court inter-
preted the Constitution as prohibiting vote dilution, it was not long
before vote dilution became relevant to the standard for a prohibited
effect.38
Beer v. United States reaffirmed that vote dilution was relevant to
the standard for a prohibited effect. The harder issue-and the issue
for which Beer has become a landmark-was in setting the exact stan-
dard for section 5 if vote dilution was relevant. The Court held that
the standard for a prohibited effect was "retrogression in the position
of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the elec-
toral franchise."3 9 While the Court did not explicitly address what
amounted to the "effective exercise of the electoral franchise"
(nondiluted vote), it implied that it was the ability to elect preferred
representatives. 40 Thus, the Court's standard for a prohibited effect
in the context of redistricting could have been written as the follow-
ing: "A proposed redistricting plan's reduction of the ability of minori-
ties to elect their preferred representatives as compared with the
benchmark districting." The VRARA would codify a variation of this
standard thirty years later in response to Georgia v. Ashcroft.41
Subsequent amendments to the VRA 42 did not further define the
standard for a prohibited effect, leaving Beers standard unchanged. 4 3
Congress could have addressed whether a proposed redistricting
plan's reduction of the ability of minorities to elect their preferred
representatives violates section 5, as Beer implied. But it chose not to.
Likewise, the district court and Supreme Court took few opportunities
to clarify the Beer standard4 4 until Ashcroft. The DOJ handled
37 J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
1965-2007, 86 TEX. L. REv. 667, 684 (2008).
38 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1969) (finding that vote
dilution was relevant to section 5).
39 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
40 See id.
41 See infra Part II.
42 See sources cited supra note 5.
43 These amendments were not insignificant. Most significantly, in responding to
the discriminatory intent requirement that the Court had read into the constitutional
standard for vote dilution, Congress sought to decouple section 2 from the Constitu-
tion. The amendments to the VRA in 1982 made clear that vote dilution under sec-
tion 2 did not require discriminatory intent, just the effect of vote dilution. Pub. L.
No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 133 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)).
44 David J. Becker, Saving Section 5: Reflections on Georgia v. Ashcroft, and Its
Impact on the Reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS Acr
REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006, at 223, 228 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007) ("Over time, until
the Ashcroft decision, there were few published cases discussing the Beer standard.").
Becker was the DOJ's lead attorney for Georgia v. Ashcroft. See id. at 223 n.1.
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preclearance of most proposed redistricting plans.45 Following Beer
and consistent with it, the DOJ's standard was as follows:
A proposed plan is retrogressive under the Section 5 "effect"
prong if its "net" effect would be to reduce minority voters'[ ]
"effective exercise of the electoral franchise" when compared to the
benchmark plan. The effective exercise of the electoral franchise
usually is assessed in redistricting submissions in terms of the oppor-
tunity for minority voters to elect candidates of their choice.46
Ashcroft revised the Beer standard as "'retrogression in the posi-
tion of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise.' 4 7 The Court held in a narrow 5-4 decision that
the standard permitted a proposed redistricting plan to reduce the
ability of minorities to elect their candidates of choice as compared to
benchmark districting, provided that there was an increase in the
opportunity of minorities to participate in the political process.48 In
practice, this standard permits the trading of descriptive representa-
tion for substantive representation 4 9 through the trading of safe dis-
tricts for "influence districts" or control of the state legislature by
minorities' preferred party. The reaction of civil rights groups and
others to the apparent abandonment of descriptive representation of
minorities was "swift and heated"50 and gave rise to the VRARA, which
made a proposed redistricting plan's "diminishing the ability" of
minorities "to elect their preferred candidates of choice" a prohibited
effect.
As a preliminary matter, Ashcroft held that the standard for a pro-
hibited effect focused on the proposed redistricting plan as a whole,
not on a district standing alone.51 Next, the Court reasoned that its
standard for a prohibited effect was necessary because the "effective
exercise of the electoral franchise" means more than the ability of
45 Becker, supra note 44, at 228.
46 Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 5411, 5413 (Jan. 18, 2001) (citation omitted).
47 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 462 (2003) (quoting Beer v. United States,
425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).
48 Id. at 480.
49 Definitions vary, but as a general matter, substantive representation means rep-
resentation sympathetic to minorities' interests; descriptive representation means repr-
sentatives preferred by minorities.
50 Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 14, at 633. But cf MichaelJ. Pitts, Georgia v.
Ashcroft: It's the End of Section 5 as We Know It (And I Feel Fine), 32 PEPP. L. REV. 265,
284-91 (2005) (arguing that Ashcroft was necessary to ensure section 5's continuing
constitutionality).
51 Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 479. This makes unnecessary a comparison of District A in
the proposed redistricting plan with District A in the benchmark districting.
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minorities to elect their candidates of choice. Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing for the majority, explained: "In addition to the comparative ability
of a minority group to elect a candidate of its choice, the other highly
relevant factor in a retrogression inquiry is the extent to which a new
plan changes the minority group's opportunity to participate in the
political process."52 The Court explained that the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the political process could take many forms, such as influ-
ence districts, "where minority voters may not be able to elect a
candidate of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in
the electoral process."5 3 Justice O'Connor added that in order for
influence districts to provide an opportunity for minorities to partici-
pate in the political process, the districts must have representatives
respond to the interest of minorities:54 "In addition to influence dis-
tricts, one other method of assessing the minority group's opportunity
to participate in the political process is to examine the comparative
position of legislative leadership, influence, and power for representa-
tives of the benchmark majority-minority districts."55 Also relevant
was approval or disapproval of the proposed redistricting plan by the
representatives of minorities (i.e., community leaders).56
The dissent, led by Justice Souter, began by characterizing (quite
accurately) the implication of the majority's standard for a prohibited
effect: "The Court holds . . . that there would be no retrogression
when the power of a voting majority of minority voters is eliminated,
so long as elected politicians can be expected to give some considera-
tion to minority interests. The power to elect a candidate of choice
has been forgotten .... "67 Justice Souter identified another issue with
this standard for a prohibited effect, namely its administrability. Mter
listing a number of questions that the new standard raised, such as the
definition of "influence," the dissent concluded: "[T]here are no
answers of any use under § 5. The fault is more fundamental, and the
very fact that the Court's interpretation of nonretrogression under § 5
invites unanswerable questions points to the error of a § 5
preclearance regime that defies reviewable administration."5 8 At bot-
tom, the dissent thought that minorities would lose under the new
standard, reasoning that "if in subsequent cases the Court allows the
52 Id. at 482.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 483.
56 Id. at 471. This Part omits Ashcroft's ability-to-elect discussion and saves it for
the discussion of the proposed ability-to-elect standard. See infra Part II.E.
57 Id. at 495 (Souter, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 496.
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state's burden to be satisfied on the pretense that unquantifiable
influence can be equated with majority-minority power, § 5 will simply
drop out as a safeguard."59
II. ABILITY-TO-ELECT STANDARDS
The twenty-five-year reauthorization of section 5 from the 1982
amendments was set to expire in 2007. Considering that few politi-
cians wanted to be on record as opposing the extension of part of one
of the most important civil rights laws of the twentieth century,60 the
VRARA passed by a large margin in Congress.61 There was, however,
an underlying sharp disagreement over the decision to reauthorize
section 5 and, more relevant to this Note, the meaning of its amend-
ments. 62 The sharp disagreement under the veneer of bipartisanship
is best illustrated by the story behind the Senate Report: "Never before
in American history . . . has a Senate committee that unanimously
voted in favor of a law later published a postenactment committee
report that was supported only by members of one party."63
The VRARA prohibits a proposed redistricting plan from dimin-
ishing of the ability of minorities to elect their preferred candidates of
choice. The VRARA does not overrule Beer's interpretation of a pro-
hibited effect as "retrogression," only Ashcroft's interpretation of the
"effective exercise of the electoral franchise" as the ability to elect can-
didates of choice and the opportunity of minorities to participate in
the political process. It did not help the majority's reasoning that
" [e]ven before Ashcroft was argued in the Supreme Court, the hard-
headed calculations that created the opportunity for O'Connor's
practical, ad hoc opinion had proven wildly incorrect"64: four Demo-
crats in influence districts had switched parties after the election, giv-
ing Republicans control of the state senate in Georgia.65
59 Id. at 497.
60 Persily, supra note 27, at 179-80.
61 The vote in the House was a comfortable 390-33, see 152 CONG. REc. H5207
(daily ed. July 13, 2006), and the vote in the Senate was a resounding 98-0, see 152
CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006).
62 Persily, supra note 27, at 180. For a discussion of the "strange, ironic" nature of
the passage of the VRARA, see Kousser, supra note 37, at 669 ("Never has the radical,
still-controversial Act been treated in such hushed, reverential tones, and never has its
discussion been so blatantly manipulated for immediate partisan advantage. Never
have there been so many proposals for comprehensive changes when the temporary
parts of the Act have come up for renewal, and never has there been less serious
debate about the Act in committees and on the floor of Congress.").
63 Persily, supra note 27, at 178.
64 Kousser, supra note 37, at 740.
65 Id.
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The VRARA does not provide a standard to determine whether a
proposed redistricting plan "diminish[es] the ability" of minorities "to
elect their preferred candidates of choice" because Congress could
not agree on one. But it is logical to assume that the ability-to-elect
standard should not permit the trading of substantive representation
for descriptive representation through the trading of safe districts for
influence districts because it was these tradeoffs that gave rise to the
VRARA.66
A. The Senate Report's Ability-to-Elect Standard
The Senate Report, authored after the vote and only by Republi-
cans, provides a standard that requires that a majority-minority district
in the benchmark districting to remain a majority-minority district in
the proposed redistricting plan.6 7 The Senate Report's standard does
not focus on the proposed redistricting plan as a whole, but instead
on a district standing alone. To complicate matters, the Senate
Report's standard only protects "naturally occurring" majority-minor-
ity districts,68 which probably means "districts drawn in urban areas
with high concentrations of minority voters."69 To further complicate
matters, there remains the issue as to the precise requirement for the
district to be a majority-minority district.70
Even a naturally occurring majority-minority district is protected
only from elimination.7' This means that the number of minorities in
the district could be decreased until the minorities in the district are a
majority by one person. The problem with permitting such a decrease
in the number of minorities is that a district in which it is highly likely
that minorities will elect their preferred candidates of choice may
become a district in which it is no longer highly likely or more likely
than not that minorities will elect their preferred candidates of
choice. This is because, inter alia, enough minorities failing to vote
endangers the likelihood. If the drafters of the VRARA sought to
overrule Ashcroft's allowance of the trading of descriptive representa-
tion for substantive representation, the Senate Report's standard is
especially egregious because descriptive representation is traded for
nothing.
66 Persily, supra note 27, at 247-48.
67 S. REP. No. 109-295, at 20-21 (2006).
68 Id. at 15, 21.
69 Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 14, at 649.
70 See infra note 108.
71 See Persily, supra note 27, at 244.
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The Senate Report takes pains to make clear that its standard
does not protect coalitional and influence districts from elimination.72
The Senate Report is correct to dismiss the definition of influence
districts as vague, making protecting them unworkable. An even more
satisfying reason for permitting the elimination of influence districts is
that in such districts minorities "may not [even] be able to elect a
candidate of choice" and "can [only] play a substantial, . . . not deci-
sive, role in the electoral process."73 While there is "influence" in
influence districts, there is little likelihood of minorities electing their
preferred candidates of choice. However, the Senate Report stan-
dard's permitting the elimination of coalition districts is untenable
because they are districts in which it is more likely than not that
minorities will elect their preferred candidates of choice with assis-
tance from whites and other minority groups. Not protecting coali-
tional districts permits the trading of descriptive representation for
nothing-the same consequence of permitting the decrease in the
number of minorities in majority-minority districts until minorities in
the district are a majority by one person.
The Senate Report's refusal to protect coalitional districts from
elimination rests on at least three grounds.74 First, it rests on the
unrealistic assumption that such districts provide only the ability of
minorities to elect 'just a candidate of choice settled for when forced
to compromise with other groups."75 The Senate Report refuses to
acknowledge the existence now or in the next twenty-five years of a
true coalitional district, one in which whites or other minorities vote
for the minorities' preferred candidates of choice. In such a state of
denial, it is hardly surprising that the Senate Report refuses to protect
coalitional districts.
Second, the Senate Report claims that protecting only majority-
minority districts protects the districts "with which section 5 was origi-
nally concerned."76 To the contrary, section 5 was originally a corol-
lary to section 4 and was only aimed at vote denial, not vote dilution
through redistricting.7 7 Assuming that the original aim of section 5
was protecting majority-minority districts, the Court in Beer-its first
significant redistricting case under section 5-did not read section 5
72 S. REP. No. 109-295, at 21.
73 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003).
74 One of the grounds, partisan motivation, is omitted from the analysis in this
Note. For a brief discussion of the partisan motivation behind the Senate Report's
proposed standard, see Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 14, at 649-50.
75 S. REP. No. 109-295, at 21.
76 Id.
77 Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 14, at 636-37.
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as necessarily protecting only majority-minority districts.78 An ability-
to-elect standard such as the Senate Report's standard should be
avoided in consideration of the nearly three decades of the DOJ's pro-
tection of coalitional districts, discussed below.7 9 The number of coal-
itional districts that have been protected is presumably large and,
thus, the Senate Report's ability-elect-standard will invite the elimina-
tion of a large number of districts in which it is more likely than not
that minorities will elect their preferred candidates of choice in the
initial round of redistricting.
Third, the Senate Report's refusal to protect coalitional districts
stems from a fear that protecting coalitional districts would in turn
require permitting the trading of safe districts for coalitional districts.
This would mean the trading of a district in which it is highly likely
that minorities will elect their preferred candidates of choice for a
district in which it is more likely than not that minorities will elect
their preferred candidates of choice. The Senate Report explains that
"[t]his approach would avoid what one minority witness called the
'cracking of majority-minority districts."'80 Admittedly, the Senate
Report's fear is well founded. But this should not be of much concern
because the tradeoff would result in a district in which it is still more
likely than not or even highly likely that the minorities will elect their
preferred candidates of choice. The Senate Report's standard itself is
not immune from tradeoffs between districts in which it is highly
likely that minorities will elect their preferred candidates of choice for
districts in which it is more likely than not. As discussed earlier, the
Senate Report's standard permits a decrease in the number of minori-
ties in majority-minority districts, which in effect permits a tradeoff
between a safe district and a district in which it is no longer highly
likely or more likely than not that minorities will elect their preferred
candidates of choice.
The Democrats who did not sign on to the Senate Report pro-
vided brief additional views that made clear that they did not agree
with its standard. While the Democrats did not explicitly provide a
standard of their own, it is clear that their issue with Senate Report's
ability-to-elect standard is that it only protects majority-minority dis-
tricts, not coalitional districts, and does not permit the trading of safe
districts for coalitional districts. Echoing other Democrats, Senator
Edward Kennedy stated the following on the floor:
78 For further discussion of the Court's reading of section 5, see infra Part II.C.
79 For further discussion of the DOJ's ability-to-elect standard, see infra Part II.C.
80 S. REP. No. 109-295, at 21 (2006) (quoting Nathaniel Persily, Professor of Law
and Political Science, Univ. of Penn.).
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[W] hile the standard rejects the notion that 'ability-to-elect' districts
can be traded for 'influence' districts, it also recognizes that minor-
ity voters may be able to elect candidates of their choice with relia-
ble crossover support and, thus, does not mandate the creation and
maintenance of majority-minority districts in all circumstances. The
test is fact specific, and turns on the particular circumstances of
each case.81
B. The House Report's Ability-to-Elect Standard
As for the House Report, it may even be a stretch to describe what
it provides as an ability-to-elect standard. As Persily describes it:
The House Report also evaded the tough questions concerning the
retrogression standard by merely clarifying (and reiterating ad
nauseum) that it overruled Georgia v. Ashcroft, reinstated the stan-
dard from Beer v. United States, and focused the retrogression inquiry
on the "ability to elect" rather than on any amorphous standard of
influence. 82
The only thing that comes close in the House Report to an ability-to-
elect standard is the following: "Voting changes that leave a minority
group less able to elect a preferred candidate of choice, either directly
or when coalesced with other voters, cannot be precleared under Sec-
tion 5."8 As Persily writes, "From this sentence one might reasonably
conclude both that a tradeoff of majority-minority districts with coali-
tional districts would not violate the new section 5, and that a reduc-
tion in the number of coalitional districts would in fact be
retrogressive."8 4 Thus, the House Report's standard does what the
Senate Report's standard does not; that is, it protects coalitional dis-
tricts and permits the trading of safe districts for coalitional districts.
C. The DOJ's Ability-to-Elect Standard
The DOJ's standard relies on Beer. While Beer did not explicitly
announce a standard to determine whether a proposed redistricting
plan reduces the ability of minorities to elect their preferred repre-
sentatives as compared to the benchmark districting, one can extrapo-
late a standard from the explanation of the lack of a prohibited effect:
Under [a reapportionment plan proposed by the New Orleans City
Counsel],... Negroes will constitute a majority of the population in
two of the five districts and a clear majority of the registered voters
81 152 CONG. REc. S8010 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
82 Persily, supra note 27, at 190 (citations omitted).
83 H.R. REP. No. 109478, at 71 (2006).
84 Persily, supra note 27, at 237.
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in one of them. Thus, there is every reason to predict, upon the
District Court's hypothesis of bloc voting, that at least one and per-
haps two Negroes may well be elected to the council under [the
plan].*85
As a preliminary matter, the Court indicated that, unlike the Senate
Report's standard, the Beer standard focuses on the proposed redis-
tricting plan as a whole, not a district standing alone. Beers implied
ability-to-elect standard requires the number of districts in the pro-
posed redistricting plan in which minorities "may well" elect blacks
(who the Court assumed were the preferred representatives in the
1970s) to remain the same or increase. While the fact that a district is
a majority-minority district is relevant to determining whether a dis-
trict is a "may well" district, Beds implied ability-to-elect standard does
not require that the number of majority-minority districts in the pro-
posed redistricting plan remains the same or increases. The standard
also takes into account whether there is racially polarized voting,
which is a way of taking into account whether there is assistance from
whites and other minority groups. This taking into account of racially
polarized voting suggests that the standard protects coalitional dis-
tricts and permits the trading of safe districts for coalitional districts.
The DOJ's ability-to-elect standard is the one that many scholars
think will be followed because the VRARA only requires the DOJ to do
what it had been doing before Ashcroft shifted the focus away from the
ability to elect.8 6 As the DOJ explained its standard in the Federal
Register in 2001:
Although comparison of the census population of districts in the
benchmark and proposed plans is the important starting point of
any retrogression analysis, our review and analysis will be greatly
facilitated by inclusion of additional demographic and election data
in the submission. For example, census population data may not
reflect significant differences in group voting behavior. Therefore,
election history and voting patterns within the jurisdiction, voter
registration and turnout information, and other similar information
are very important to an assessment of the actual effect of a redis-
tricting plan. This information is used to compare minority voting
85 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 142 (1976).
86 See, e.g., Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 14, at 650 (noting that leading inter-
pretation of the standard "is that the VRARA returns retrogression analysis to its pre-
Georgia v. Ashcroft state"); Persily, supra note 27, at 226 (stating that DOJ's standard is
"likely to rule the day once again").
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strength in the benchmark plan as a whole with minority voting
strength in the proposed plan as a whole.8 7
Professors David L. Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran write of the
way in which the DOJ implements this ability-to-elect standard88 : First,
it determines the number of minorities necessary in a district for
minorities to have the "opportunity" to elect their candidates of
choice, that is, to be an "opportunity district." This is the "threshold
below which minority-supported candidates have very little chance of
gaining office and above which they are practically certain to win."89
The number of minorities required in a district factors in assistance
from whites and other minority groups; that is, the DOJ's standard
protects coalitional districts.90 Second, the DOJ determines the num-
ber of opportunity districts in the benchmark districting. Third, the
DOJ determines how many districts in the proposed redistricting plan
are opportunity districts. There must be at least as many opportunity
districts in the proposed redistricting plan as the benchmark redis-
tricting.91 In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the DOJ arguably added a fourth step
that prohibits trading safe districts for coalitional districts.9 2
D. Persily's Ability-to-Elect Standard
Persily provides the following relatively extreme standard and rea-
soning behind it:
Section 5 should be read as preventing new districting plans that
reduce the aggregated probability across districts that minorities will
elect the candidates that they prefer and that whites generally disfa-
vor. This standard escapes the charges of partisan bias or racial
essentialism that would rightly be lodged against alternatives. More-
over, throughout the twenty-five year tenure of this law, it will not
87 Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 5411, 5413 (Jan. 18, 2006) (citation omitted) (foot-
note omitted).
88 Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 14, at 640-41.
89 Id. at 641. Opportunity districts in the DOJ's ability-to-elect standard require
that there be a greater likelihood than the ability-to-elect districts in the proposed
ability-to-elect standard.
90 Becker, supra note 44, at 238.
91 Note that this three-step process focuses on the proposed redistricting plan as
a whole as compared with the benchmark district, not a district standing alone.
92 See Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 14, at 644 ("Such a menagerie of choices
immediately raises difficult questions about tradeoffs. How many coalitional districts
does one need to outweigh one safely controlled district? Perhaps some combination
of coalitional and probable-control districts may outweigh one safe district? Or per-
haps, as the DOJ argued, there is no combination of other district types that could
possibly offset the loss of even one safe district.").
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hamstring jurisdictions into a legal framework predicated on the
persistence of outdated assessments of racial polarization in the
electorate.93
As long as in the proposed redistricting plan the probability of minori-
ties electing their preferred candidates of choice remains the same or
increases in the aggregate, safe districts could be traded for districts
with very low likelihood.94 Persily recognizes that this standard is
extreme: "After all, the interpretation proposed here would allow the
trading of one 100% ability-to-elect district for ten 10% ability-to-elect
districts."95
Persily contends, accurately, that his standard permits less
extreme tradeoffs than the Ashcroft Court permitted because his stan-
dard's tradeoff of safe districts at least requires that the traded-for dis-
tricts have some probability of minorities electing their preferred
candidates of choice. After all, the Ashcroft Court did not require that
safe districts be traded for districts in which there was any probability
of minorities electing their preferred candidates of choice-just influ-
ence districts or control of the state legislature by the minorities' pre-
ferred party. Persily describes the difference as "preventing
reductions in the number of ability-to-elect districts to increase the
number of influence districts or to capture control of the legislature is
not the same as banning tradeoffs among ability-to-elect districts."9 6
Persily contends that his standard only permits tradeoffs among abil-
ity-to-elect districts. Persily is correct only because his definition of an
ability-to-elect district is expansive, including a district in which minor-
ities have a ten-percent probability of electing their preferred candi-
dates of choice.
Because the term ability-to-elect district denotes a district in
which it is more likely than not that the minorities will elect their pre-
ferred candidates of choice, I would describe Persily's standard as per-
mitting the trading of safe districts for "tossup districts" or "hopeless
93 Persily, supra note 27, at 219.
94 See Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 14, at 654 ("[Persily's approach] is no
doubt the 'cleanest' approach to the problem, mathematically precise and intuitively
clear. It emphasizes the fact that retrogression is a standard applied to plans, not
districts, and makes obvious the requirement that diminutions in the ability to elect in
some districts must be offset by equal or greater gains elsewhere. It would, however,
allow tradeoffs such as dismantling one district where a minority-supported candidate
was sure to win for three districts with a one-third probability each. This 'gambling' of
some safe seats makes some observers queasy. On the other hand, with favorable
electoral results, this strategy could increase overall minority office-holding by gener-
ating more minority wins than would occur with just safe seats." (footnote omitted)).
95 Persily, supra note 27, at 248.
96 Id. at 247.
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districts," which is prohibited under the proposed standard.97 Persily
acknowledges that even though the drafters of the VRARA may have
been responding to the more extreme trading permitted by the Court
of safe districts for influence districts or control of the state legislature
by the minorities' preferred party, "[for those who worry about any
decrease in minority descriptive representation, . . . trading a few safe
seats for a larger number of ... districts [with low probability] would
invite the same criticism as would such tradeoffs to increase the num-
ber of influence districts."98
In response to the fair criticism that his interpretation frustrates
the intent of the drafters of the VRARA to prohibit the trading of
descriptive representation for substantive representation, Persily
explains that his standard prevents constitutional difficulty posed by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments' enforcement clauses:
An interpretation of the new section 5 that seems to freeze majority-
minority districts for twenty-five years raises concerns about racial
predominance akin to those expressed in the Shaw line of cases.
The decision to mandate a particular view of descriptive representa-
tion in a subset of states also raises concerns that Congress has
exceeded its remedial and prophylactic authority under section 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment or section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.99
While Persily's standard avoids constitutional difficulty, so too would a
standard that draws from the Court's ability-to-elect discussion (to the
extent that the Court was motivated by constitutional avoidance in its
ability-to-elect discussion), as proposed by this Note. 0 0
E. Proposed Ability-to-Elect Standard
This Note draws from the ability-to-elect discussion in Georgia v.
Ashcroft to propose a standard for the following reasons: First, the leg-
islative history is self-contradictory regarding a standard.10 1 Second,
the language of the VRARA only overrules the Ashcroft standard for a
prohibited effect. 02 The language standing alone does not overrule the
97 See infra Part II.E.
98 Persily, supra note 27, at 248.
99 Id. at 248-49.
100 But cf supra note 33.
101 See supra Parts II.A-II.B.
102 This was the prohibited-effect standard that permitted a proposed redistricting
plan's reducing the ability of minorities to elect their candidates of choice, provided
there was an increase in the opportunity of minorities to participate in the political
process.
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discussion in Ashcroft describing two proposed redistricting plans that
do not reduce the ability of minorities to elect their candidates of
choice-the language actually draws attention to it. Third, and per-
haps most compellingly, the dissent signed on to the ability-to-elect
discussion, only taking issue with the standard for a prohibited
effect.' 03 A necessary caveat here is that the ability-to-elect discussion
was dictum, as the Court never had to rule on whether the proposed
redistricting plan reduced the ability of minorities to elect their candi-
dates of choice. The Court held that even if the redistricting plan
reduced the ability of minorities to elect their candidates of choice,
the district court had failed to consider whether there was an increase
in the opportunity of minorities to participate in the political process.
The discussion in Ashcroft described two proposed redistricting
plans that would not reduce the ability of minorities to elect their can-
didates of choice: First, starting with the uncontroversial proposed
redistricting plan, "[imn order to maximize the electoral success of a
minority group, a State may choose to create a certain number of
'safe' districts, in which it is highly likely that minority voters will elect
the candidate of their choice."' 0 4 Controversially, a state can "choose
to create a greater number of districts in which it is likely-although
perhaps not quite as likely as under the benchmark plan-that minor-
ity voters will be able to elect candidates of their choice." 0 5 The
Court explained that while the second option creates greater risk that
minorities will not elect their candidates of choice, " [s] uch a strategy
has the potential to increase 'substantive representation' in more dis-
tricts, by creating coalitions of voters who together will help to achieve
the electoral aspirations of the minority group. It also, however, cre-
ates the risk that the minority group's preferred candidate may
lose."106
1. Classification of Districts
The proposed standard requires that the districts in the bench-
mark districting and proposed redistricting plans be classified in
terms of the likelihood of minorities electing their preferred candi-
dates of choice, not in terms of the number of minorities in the dis-
trict. There are five kinds of districts: (1) A safe district, as the term
was used in Ashcroft, is a district in which it is highly likely that minori-
ties will elect their preferred candidates of choice, without assistance
103 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 492-93 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 480 (majority opinion).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 481 (citation omitted).
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from whites and other minority groups. A safe district is by definition
an ability-to-elect district,1 07 which is one in which it is more likely
than not that minorities will elect their preferred candidates of
choice. A majority-minority 08 district is not necessarily an ability-to-
elect district because, inter alia, enough minorities failing to vote may
endanger the likelihood of minorities electing their preferred candi-
dates of choice. The most common form of a safe district is a
supermajority-minority district. 09 (2) A coalitional district is a district
in which minorities constitute the minority, but it is still more likely
than not that minorities will elect their preferred candidates of
choice, with assistance from whites and other minority groups. The
proposed standard protects coalitional districts; that is, a coalitional
district is an ability-to-elect district, just like a safe district. It is worth
noting that not all ability-to-elect districts are either safe districts or
coalitional districts. A district in which minorities constitute the
majority and are more likely than not (but not highly likely) to elect
their preferred candidates of choice is an ability-to-elect district. Safe
districts and coalitional district are given their own sub-category
because they are the extreme types of ability-to-elect districts. (3) A
"tossup district" 10 is one in which the likelihood of minorities elect-
ing their preferred candidates of choice is significantly greater than
zero, but it is not more likely than not. A tossup district is by defini-
tion not an ability-to-elect district. There may be a fifty-percent
107 The Court does not use the term "ability-to-elect district," but describes dis-
tricts in which it is "likely" that minorities will elect their preferred candidates of
choice as ones in which minorities have the ability to elect their preferred candidates
of choice. See id. at 480.
108 According to Persily,
[a]s an initial matter, the moniker "majority-minority" is not as concrete as it
first sounds. The central question will often be: majority of what? That is,
what should the denominator be for which minorities constitute over 50% of
the given district? Should it be population, voting age population (VAP),
citizen voting age population (CVAP), eligible voting population, registered
voters, or likely voters?
Persily, supra note 27, at 241. The difficulty in defining majority-minority districts is
just one of many reasons against using a standard that protects majority-minority
districts.
109 A "supermajority-minority district" has a high percentage of minorities.
110 Becker, supra note 44, at 251. This is not a term used by the Ashcroft Court, but
one that is necessarily implied because the Court leaves a hole in its description of
districts. It jumps from an influence district (a district in which there is no or very
little likelihood of minorities electing their preferred candidates of choice) to an abil-
ity-to-elect district (a district in which it is more likely than not that minorities will
elect their preferred candidates of choice). Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 495-96. Ostensibly,
there must be a type of district between these two.
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probability, which of course does not make it more likely than not. A
common form of a tossup district is a minority-minority district that is
not a coalitional district because there is not enough assistance from
whites and other minority groups. Similarly, a majority-minority dis-
trict could still be a tossup district and not an ability-to-elect district
because, inter alia, enough minorities failing to vote endangers the
likelihood. (4) An influence district is one in which there is zero or
very little likelihood of minorities electing their candidates, but
minorities "can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral
process."" 1 (5) Lastly, there are "hopeless districts,"11 2 which are dis-
tricts in which minorities have zero or very little likelihood of electing
their preferred candidates of choice, and minorities do not play a role
in the electoral process, which would make the district an influence
district.
2. Proposed Ability-to-Elect Standard's Requirements
After categorizing the districts in the proposed redistricting plan
and benchmark districting, this Note proposes a standard that
requires the number of ability-to-elects districts in the proposed redis-
tricting plan to remain the same or increase.s13 If this is the only
requirement, then the proposed standard implicitly focuses on the
proposed redistricting plan as a whole, not a district standing alone.
Additionally, if a coalitional district is an ability-to-elect district, it is
necessarily implied that the proposed standard permits the trading of
safe districts for coalitional districts.' 4
This proposed standard differs from the Senate Report's-and is
similar to the DOJ's-in its protection of coalitional districts. The
111 Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 482.
112 The Ashcroft Court does not use this term or even describe this type of district,
but it is necessarily implied: there must be a type of district that has the likelihood of
an influence district absent the influence.
113 In the Court's ability-to-elect discussion, the number of ability-to-elect districts
remained the same in the first proposed redistricting plan and increased in the sec-
ond one. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 492.
114 This is the second tradeoff in the ability-to-elect discussion and the Court prob-
ably included the ability-to-elect discussion to make clear that trading of safe districts
for coalitional districts was permissible. Most notably, the dissent endorsed the trad-
ing of safe districts for coalitional districts:
The prudential objective of § 5 is hardly betrayed if a State can show that a
new districting plan shifts from supermajority districts, in which minorities
can elect their candidates of choice by their own voting power, to coalition
districts, in which minorities are in fact shown to have a similar opportunity
when joined by predictably supportive nonminority voters.
Id. at 492 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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proposed standard differs from the DOJ's in its definition of an ability-
to-elect district as one in which it is more likely than not that minori-
ties will elect their preferred candidates of choice. In contrast, the
DOJ's standard requires a higher degree of likelihood to be an oppor-
tunity district. Additionally, the proposed standard permits the trad-
ing of safe districts for coalitional districts.
The Court's ability-to-elect discussion, on which this Note's pro-
posed standard is based, has been characterized as 'jarring" and "a
significant departure from its earlier approach."115 This apparently
refers to permitting the trading of safe districts for coalitional districts,
as the Court defined them. The Court explained the effects of such a
tradeoff: "Such a strategy has the potential to increase 'substantive
representation' in more districts, by creating coalitions of voters who
together will help to achieve the electoral aspirations of the minority
group. It also, however, creates the risk that the minority group's pre-
ferred candidate may lose."' 16 In short, the trading of safe districts for
coalitional districts could equate to a trading of a district in which it is
highly likely that minorities will elect their preferred candidates of
choice for one in which it is more likely than not.11 7
I offer several responses to those who are upset by the Court's
ability-to-elect discussion: First, it may be highly likely that minorities
will elect their preferred candidates of choice in a coalitional district.
Coalitional districts are not just districts in which it is more likely than
not that the minorities will elect their preferred candidates of
choice-this is only the threshold.118 Second, coalitional districts are
by definition ability-to-elect districts. It would be jarring for the Court
to permit the trading of safe districts for influence districts, tossup
districts, hopeless districts, or control of the state legislature by the
minorities' preferred party in its ability-to-elect discussion: all of these
are tradeoffs in which it is not more likely than not that minorities will
elect their preferred candidates of choice. In short, standard simply
permits the trading of one ability-to-elect district for another ability-to-
elect district, as the Court defined an ability-to-elect district. (Admit-
tedly, however, the Court defines an ability-to-elect district much dif-
ferently than the DOJ defines opportunity districts.) Third, the
Court's acknowledgment that coalitional districts are riskier than safe
115 Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3
ELECION L.J. 21, 30-31 (2004).
116 Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 481 (citation omitted).
117 This could mean the trading of a district with 99% probability for a district
with 50.01% probability.
118 This means that a state is permitted to trade a district with a 50.01% probability
for a district with 99% probability.
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districts is of little significance. Ability-to-elect districts are still dis-
tricts in which it is more likely than not that the minorities will elect
their preferred candidates of choice. The Court is only stating the
obvious: there is no guarantee in ability-to-elect districts. The Court's
caveat that a "minority group's candidate may lose" does not change
the fact that the coalitional district still must be one in which it is
more likely than not that minorities will elect their preferred candi-
dates of choice.
Fourth, it is easy to overreact to the Court's explanation that the
tradeoff of safe districts for coalitional districts has the potential to
increase "substantive representation." If the VRARA sought to pro-
hibit trading of descriptive representation for substantive representa-
tion, one might be concerned by the Court's invocation of substantive
representation. However, while permitting the trading of safe districts
for coalitional districts has the potential of increasing substantive rep-
resentation, it is not at the cost of descriptive representation. The
trading of safe districts for coalitional districts may simultaneously
increase substantive representation and descriptive representation, or
at least maintain descriptive representation. 119 However, one could
argue that the tradeoff of safe districts for coalitional districts increases
the risk of a decrease in descriptive representation. This increase in risk is
real. Minorities could have less likelihood of electing their preferred
candidates of choice in coalitional districts as compared to safe dis-
tricts. However, an increased risk of a decrease in descriptive repre-
sentation is a far cry from what gave rise to the VRARA. In the
tradeoff that gave rise to the VRARA, the decrease in descriptive rep-
resentation was guaranteed; that is, a state's proposed redistricting
plan could survive section 5 preclearance with no likelihood of minori-
ties electing their preferred candidates of choice. States were permit-
ted to abandon descriptive representation in the name of substantive
representation, completely ignoring the likelihood that minorities will
elect their preferred candidates of choice. Under the proposed stan-
dard, the states must still keep an eye on descriptive representation
(i.e., maintain the same number of district in which it is more likely
than not that minorities will elect their preferred candidates of
choice) even if they want to seek substantive representation. Lastly,
and this may be of little comfort, some scholars argue that each of the
leading ability-to-elect standards permits the trading of descriptive
119 In other words, the proposed redistricting plan still must maintain or increase
the number of ability-to-elect districts, which could maintain the descriptive
representation.
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representation for substantive representation, despite the standards'
attempts to do otherwise. 120
CONCLUSION
More work could be done on this Note's proposed standard in its
definition of an ability-to-elect district as one in which it is more likely
than not that minorities will elect their preferred candidates of
choice. How does one calculate whether a district meets this likeli-
hood? Should the standard account for a margin of error in calculat-
ing whether the district meets this likelihood? These questions are
beyond the scope of this Note, although the DOJ's past standard's use
of probabilities indicates this calculation should not be a barrier. (But
arriving at precise percentages may be more difficult than what the
DOJ has done in the past.) Just as the Reconstruction Amendments
required the creation of the VRA, and the VRA required the creation
of the VRARA, the VRARA requires the creation of a standard to make
it effective. The proposed standard makes the VRARA effective in a
way that may avoid constitutional difficulty by drawing from the Ash-
croft's ability-to-elect discussion. Even if Congress were to provide an
ability-to-elect standard that codifies the DOJ's standard, Ashcroft indi-
cates that the Court is not hesitant to take a hard look at the standard
for section 5, even if it recently avoided the larger issue of section 5's
constitutionality.
120 See generally Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 14 (arguing that three leading
proposed standards for VRARA permit trading descriptive representation for substan-
tive representation and, thus, VRARA does not overrule Ashcroft).
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